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Romania’s participation in World War II was brought about by political reasons 
and  strategic  needs  that  resulted  from  the  international  political  situation  at  the 
middle of the twentieth century. The loss of approximately one third of the national 
territory and of six million inhabitants to the three neighbouring countries (that is the 
Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria) basically accounted for Romania’s taking part 
in military operations on both the East and the West front during World War II
1. 
One can hardly say that Romania did not do its best to avoid becoming involved 
in the war. From September 1939 to June 1941, the foreign policy laid focus on non-
belligerency and neutrality
2. But eventually Romania was drawn in, too, right after 
the series of unfortunate events in the summer of 1940
3, so that on the 22
nd of June 
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1941, Romanian troops were crossing the Prut as ordered by the head of the state at 
the time, General Ion Antonescu
1. 
As far as the requirements of waging a modern war are concerned, Romania was 
taken aback by the outbreak of the war. Romanian effective forces, though in large 
number
2, lacked in modern equipment and war techniques that such a conflagration 
asks for
3.  
The wall of fire and steel which the leaders of the time spoke of in order to 
reassure people and public opinion turned out to be a bluff made up by the for the 
sake  of  propaganda  by  the  authoritarian  monarchic  regime.  Within  few  weeks, 
Romanian frontiers would collapse under the pressure of the most important political 
and  military  forces  of the  time  that  is  Hitlerite  Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
dragging along Carol II’s regime.  
The new head of the state, Ion Antonescu, would start at once reconstructing the 
army, as he was well aware that ongoing international political events could provide 
Romania with an opportunity to make its borders stand again and to reintegrate all 
territories that had been temporarily under foreign rule. Antonescu was to join forces 
with the Axis and wage war against the Soviet Union, as strongly believed that the 
Axis stood a firm chance of winning the war
4. 
The military campaign led by the Romanian army on the East front had as an 
objective to set free Basarabia and the North of Bucovina, territories which had been 
torn apart by the Soviet Union as a result of the ultimatum delivered in June 1940
5. 
It is also true that Ion Antonescu was hoping that an estimation of Romania’s siding 
with Germany could bring along the retrocession of Ardeal; that was the very same 
reason for which Hungary also sent troops to the East front and declared war to the 
Soviet Union
6. 
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Owing to the alliance with Germany, the two provinces were set free in July, not 
without major human sacrifice
1, and political controversy whether or not war against 
the Soviets should be waged beyond the Nistru soon broke out between political 
opposition,  represented  by  the  historical  parties,  and  marshal  Antonescu’s 
government. It stands to reason that the head of the state had the last say in this 
matter and that Romanian soldiers would go and fight in the wilderness of Russia. 
They fought courageously besides German allies who would often show gratitude 
for their support and sacrifice. 
Three times were the Romanian and German troops defeated, in Stalingrad, in 
Crimea and on the Moldavian front Iaşi - Chişinău, and the defeats meant military 
disaster  as  they  put  an  end  to  the  Romanian  campaign  on  the  East  front.  The 
campaign had taken three years and two months (the 22
nd of June 1941 – the 23
rd of 
August 1944). The defeat of the Romanian army on the front in Moldova during the 
Soviet offensive Iaşi – Chişinău, together with the effects of the blow at the palace 
and the arresting of the marshal and his people would eventually result in Romania’s 
withdrawal from its alliance with Germany
2 against a country which had taken away 
a big part of our national territory
3. 
  In  the  new  political  context,  the  Romanian  authorities  in  Bucharest  would 
manage to stand alone and face Germany’s anger; Romanian troops disarmed and 
set free most part of the national territory, including the capital, and paved the way 
for the Soviet Army. As for the significance and the importance of what happened 
on  the  23
rd  of  August,  it  has  become  clear  by  now  that  the  act  will  always  be 
interpreted according to the evolution of political events
4. 
Nevertheless,  the  Romanian  troops’  volte-face  would  have  unpleasant 
consequences, especially on the front in Moldova. As soon as the Romanian army 
units received an order to cease fire against the Soviet army and they were loose 
from the German troops to withdraw at once to the south of the fortified frontline 
Focşani-Nămoloasa-Brăila
5, the commanding officers would obey the Department of 
of Military Structures and cease hostilities against the Red Army, trying to save 
what could still be saved of the Romanian army after the front had been broken by 
the Soviets
6.  
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The  Soviet  commanding  structures  would  make  no  allowances  for  this  new 
situation, ordering Fronts II and III in Ukraine to continue the offensive against the 
enemy. Thus, a large number of Romanian soldiers who had ceased fire were taken 
prisoners and, strangely enough, they were held prisoners until the 12
th of September 
and even afterwards
1 . The condition of the officers and crew in the Danube Delta 
and on the Black Sea turned out to be just as disastrous. They were made to cease 
fire on receiving orders from the Romanian authorities and then forced to land and 
confined to Soviet camps. This is how a large part of the Romanian trading ships 
and, of course, the whole of the war fleet was lost to the Soviets
2.  
Romanian soldiers would still be captured by Soviet troops even after the truce 
was  concluded  on  the  12
th  of  September;  strangely  enough,  most  of  them  were 
captured in areas where no military operations between Romanian and Soviet forces 
had been carried out, such as Muntenia / Walachia. All these were happening while 
Romanian soldiers had to face German attack, too, for the Germans had received the 
Fuhrer’s command to restore the situation in Romania, which threatened to cause the 
collapse of the entire German military device in the Balkans.  
On the 23
rd of August 1944, the Romanian military campaign in the war against 
the  Soviets  came  to  an  end,  not  without  big  casualties  as  far  as  the  number  of 
missing  people  was  concerned,  not  to  mention  the  material  losses  in  which 
bombardment, the seizure of territories and the military techniques resulted. Since 
1942, Romania was the most important ally of Germany on the East front, as it 
disposed of some 26 Romanian divisions as compared to the eight Italian ones, the 
twelve  Hungarian  divisions  and  the  varying  number  of  Finnish  military  units. 
Obviously, among the 46 allied military units that the Germans could dispose of on 
the East front, more than half the number was represented by the Romanian units; as 
a consequence, it was only normal that Romania suffered significant human losses, 
directly proportional to the number of soldiers that had been sent to the front.  
In October 1945, an informative note of the Statistic Service of the Romanian 
army was issued to estimate the total human losses during the campaign in the East 
to  309,503  military  men.  Mention  should  be  made  of  the  fact  that  the  figures 
referred  both  to  the  ones  taken  prisoners  and  to  those  who  had  died  on  the 
battlefield, since the Romanian Department of Military Structures did not have the 
means to count the dead and the prisoners separately
3.  
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The economic cost of waging war alongside Germany turned out to be of no 
lesser importance; on the 23
rd of August, Romanian economy was under the control 
of German capital, as Germany’s debt to the Romanian state went up to some 1.5 
billion deutsche marks. Calling up a significant military contingent was to diminish 
Romania’s capacity for industrial production, whereas the country had to go to great 
lengths to keep the same production rate as before. Moreover, as Romania moved 
towards  an  economy  war,  many  financial  and  economic  resources  which  were 
normally meant for various other enterprises were now taken up to keep Romanian 
troops  on  the  front
1.  Allied  bombardments,  particularly  on  the  major  economic 
centers, will also result in significant losses for Romanian economy; oil industry was 
mainly aimed at, and human losses did not lack in significance. Among indirect 
damage and losses induced upon Romanian economy, mention should be made of 
exchanges which did not amount to Romanian currency as the deutsche mark was 
made to go up artificially as compared to the Romanian leu; thus the price of the 
products  imported  from  Germany  went  up  without  any  regard  for  the  price  of 
Romanian goods for export
2; at the same time, the purchasing power of the German 
military increased and they would take certain products off the Romanian market 
only to cause their price to go up artificially. 
The support given to German troops on Romanian territory, the payment system, 
the deductions that resulted from transport and communication were further issues to 
be tackled during collaboration with the Third Reich in the war against the Soviets. 
Whereas German military units and import-export companies purchased essential 
goods  at  very  low  prices,  the  products  imported  from  Germany  were  of  little 
necessity  to  the  Romanian  market  and  they  came  in  at  extremely  high  prices. 
Romania’s complex international position made the country extremely vulnerable 
when confronted with the terms of the German ally which was well aware of the fact 
that Romania could not object under the circumstances. These were some of the 
reasons which cast a shadow on the co-operation between Romania and Germany 
and  they  were  mainly  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that,  on  accepting  to  become 
involved  in  the  military  campaign  on  the  East  front,  Romanian  authorities  had 
overlooked  some  details, although,  legally,  Romania’s  position  was,  to  a  certain 
extent, that of an independent, autonomous state fighting against mutual enemy. 
Obviously, the two armies had not joined forces in response to some military or 
political convention; Romania joined in the war of its own accord with a view to 
setting Basarabia and Bucovina free. 
The events on the 23
rd of August were to bring about deep changes, as far as 
Romania’s foreign policy was concerned; all of a sudden, Romania was made to 
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fight - with the same objectives in mind - by the side of its former enemies and 
against its former allies. This sudden turn was sure to serve the cause of the United 
Nations,  but  Romania  would  have  to  pay  dearly  for  it;  for  a  while,  Romanian 
authorities and military forces had to resist two enemies and part of the price it had 
to pay was the large number of Romanian soldiers who had been taken prisoners by 
Soviet troops
1. 
Despite the significant losses of human lives, war materials and techniques, due 
to  cautious  course  of  action  taken  by  the  Romanian  Department  of  Military 
Structures, Romania was able to present, on the 23
rd of August, five operational 
divisions fully equipped for war and some other 29 divisions consisting mainly of 
recruits  and  other  units  which  were  billeted  with  the  non-mobile  troops  on  the 
battlefield.  Romanian  military  units  around  the  front  area  were  not  very  well 
organized as they had been destroyed by Soviet offensive, that is why the military 
campaign  against  Nazi  Germany  was  mainly  carried  out  by  these  divisions  of 
recruits provided inland by the Department of Military Structures. 
The concluding of the Truce Convention by Romania and the United Nations on 
the 12
th of September imposed the most significant terms as to how Romania should 
carry out the military campaign against Germany and its allies. The provisions were 
to  be  brought  into  operation  under  the  control  of  an  Allied  (Soviet)  Control 
Commission which, as the three great powers had established, would basically leave 
it  to  the  Soviet  Union.  The  rough  interference  of  the  representatives  of  the 
commission for control was to change the course of home policy and to affect the 
balance  of  the  state  budget,  as  goods  were  drawn  in  keeping  with  the  Truce 
Convention. 
Romanian authorities were determined to improve collaboration with the Soviet 
Union as soon as possible and to set Transylvania free, that is why they would send 
to the front more units than the 12 military divisions that the truce asked for, thus 
moving towards applying the economic provisions of the convention. As for the 
number of Romanian military men involved in military operations against German 
troops, it amounted to some 538,536 soldiers out of a total of 1,100,000 who had 
been called up to serve the cause of the United Nations. Between the 23
rd of August 
1944  and  the  12
th  of  May  1945,  Romanian  troops  had  traveled  for  about  1,700 
kilometers at around 6 kilometers a day, they moved across 12 waterways and 20 
groups of mountains and they took 3,831 villages and towns, among which there 
were  53  big  cities.  All  these  were  accomplished  through  the  sacrifice  made  by 
169,822 military men who were killed, injured or declared missing. The strategic, 
material and human support Romania gave to the United Nations was significant 
enough and it helped make the war shorter by some 200 days. 
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Although its support amounted to 1,200,000,000 dollars (1938 currency) and it 
came fourth in the hierarchy of the United Nations that fought against Germany, 
Romania was not granted the status of co-belligerent country which it was entitled 
to. The refusal was based on some political reasons that only the Great Powers knew 
of. Among all the states that had a similar situation, Romania had taken the greatest 
efforts to destroy the Nazi war machine
1.   
Despite the fact that it may have varied to some extent in keeping with the 
provisions of the Romanian-Soviet protocol on the 26
th of November, the number of 
Romanian troops involved in military operations was always higher than the one 
imposed by the Truce Convention. Moreover, Romania’s contribution hardly knew 
any limits
2: both the authorities and the civil population went to great lengths to 
support the military campaign of Romanian troops. No military unit or organization 
carried on the fight against the United Nations after the 23
rd of August. For example, 
Italy contributed some 100,000 partisans to the cause of the United Nations, whereas 
5 infantry divisions and 2 air-force squadrons would carry on fighting in the north of 
Italy on Germany’s side. As for Hungary, they came up with 10 divisions, Bulgaria 
– one pro-Nazi division, Yugoslavia - 3 divisions, 9 brigades, a division of guards 
and a regiment of cavalry. In France the number of those who carried on fighting 
soon  amounted  to  the  effective  force  of  a  quick  division,  whereas  in  Poland  it 
amounted  to  some  20-25,000military  men
3.  The  statement  Romania  made  at  the 
Peace Conference in Paris dwelled on the country’s military and economic direct 
involvement and on the extent to which they had discharged their duties until the 1
st 
of July 1945 in keeping  with article 3 of the Convention; expenses came to 77 
billion lei (1938 currency. 
The defeat of Nazi Germany saluted by most countries in Eastern and South-
Eastern  Europe  did  not  bring  about  utter  joy  since  the  alternative  was  now  the 
communist regime imposed on by the Soviet model. The alternative was rejected by 
most Eastern European societies
4 which were still vexed by the war and by the 
release of the Red Army. Hundreds of thousands of people were to fully experience 
the  advantages  of  the  Soviet  release  and  the  consequences  of  their  countries’ 
political regimes turning into popular regimes under Soviet influence. 
The fact that these popular democratic regimes were forced upon the states in 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe would prevent further economic progress of these 
societies; we all had to pay tremendous costs to return to an efficient state, and we 
are still paying them today, more than 50 years after the conflagration. But little 
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mention is made of the moral trouble, the personal failures or the fear in which most 
inhabitants of these countries lived, particularly the war prisoners. They have come a 
long way; they were first regarded as heroes on the battlefield, subsequently they 
were considered traitors to their country, as they were accused of having fought 
against the Soviet Union and of having upset the actual “big brother” that meant to 
control all East-European states and under the influence of which these states would 
embrace communism in their social and political structures. 
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